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Abstract
This paper studies optimal tax policy design problem by employing
a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete as-
set markets. We investigate the possibility of welfare-improving active,
contingent tax policies (tax rates respond to changes in productivity)
on consumption, and capital and labor income taxes. Unlike the con-
ventional wisdom regarding stabilization policies, procyclical factor in-
come tax policy is optimal in open economy. Procyclical tax policy
generates eﬃciency gains by correcting market incompleteness. Opti-
mal tax policy under cooperative equilibrium is similar to that under
the Nash equilibrium and welfare gains from tax policy coordination
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Under certain circumstances, ﬁscal policy can be eﬀectively used for sta-
bilization purposes. An example is monetary union such as the European
Union where stabilizing monetary policy is not available for regional shocks.
Another case when monetary policy is ineﬀective is a deﬂationary economy
with zero or negative real interest rate such as Japan in the late 1990s.1 In
order to properly use active ﬁscal policy rules under such circumstances, it
is important to obtain accurate welfare implications of ﬁscal policies.
This paper studies optimal tax policy design problem using an open
economy model with incomplete asset markets. In our model, a stabiliza-
tion problem exists because of distortionary taxes within each country and
incomplete asset markets across countries where sovereign bonds are the
only internationally-traded asset. We develop a two-country single-good
dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model to analyze the eﬀects of tax
policy (on consumption, and capital and labor income taxes) on the welfare
level of each individual country as well as of the world. Each country faces
productivity shocks and tax policy is active and contingent in the sense that
governments change tax rates in response to the realized productivity in the
economy. Governments maintain balanced budget in each period by using
lump-sum transfers.
We ﬁrst use the closed economy setup and analyze welfare eﬀects of
contingent tax policy versus ﬁxed (exogenous) tax policy.2 We derive the
optimal level of tax rate adjustment to productivity shocks and calculate the
amount of welfare gains from the optimal tax policy. Next, using an open
economy model with incomplete asset markets, we calculate optimal tax
policies and examine how much they are diﬀerent from the closed economy
case. We analyze welfare eﬀects of domestic tax policies on both domes-
tic and foreign countries and derive the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we investigate the possible gains from tax policy coordination by
deriving cooperative equilibrium. If non-cooperative and cooperative equi-
libria are diﬀerent, then there is room for welfare improvement via tax policy
coordination. These results can provide realistic implications on potential
1See Feldstein (2002) for the discussion on the positive role of discretionary ﬁscal policy
in this case.
2Our search for ‘optimal’ tax policy is by assuming a certain parametric family of tax
policy rules and optimizing over the parameters of the rule. This exercise is similar to
Mendoza and Tesar (1998) in that we consider welfare consequences of ad-hoc changes in
taxes. Note that this is diﬀerent from deﬁning optimal tax policy as the best possible tax
rate responses to disturbances, as in Chari et al. (1994).
2welfare eﬀects of international policy coordination.
Three main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we adopt
an open-economy framework. The literature on welfare analysis of tax
policy has focused on closed-economy.3 However, these results can dramat-
ically change under open economy because tax policies can have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on other countries through various channels such as the world inter-
est rate and capital ﬂows.4 Second, we analyze tax policies in a stochastic
setup, which has been used extensively for the analysis of monetary policy
(e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 2002, and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba 2002).
Most papers in the literature have analyzed tax policies in a deterministic
setup and focused on the eﬀects of permanent changes in tax policies or tax
policy reform.5 However, certain economic phenomena should be analyzed
under the stochastic framework. For example, recent discussion in the Eu-
ropean Union about the role of ﬁscal policies as absorbers of asymmetric
shocks is an example due to the stochastic nature of such shocks. Third,
in order to capture the nonlinear dynamics of the model which matters for
welfare analysis, we solve the model using a second-order accurate solution
method. We adopt the second-order perturbation method following Kim,
et al. (2004). It is crucial to adopt a second-order method in calculating
the level of welfare because the conventional method of linearization, such
as the one used in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), can produce inaccurate
welfare calculation as documented in Kim and Kim (2003).
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. In closed economy, optimal tax policy
is countercyclical for consumption and capital income taxes, while optimal
labor income tax policy is slightly procyclical. However, these results change
in the open economy setup; optimal capital and labor income tax policy
becomes procyclical. For example, the optimal tax response to a 1% increase
in productivity, assuming no tax policies in the foreign country, is to decrease
capital income tax rate by 0.8% or to decrease labor income tax rate by 0.7%.
3Papers with the closed economy setup include Greenwood and Huﬀman (1991), Mc-
Grattan (1994), and Chari et al. (1994). In many cases, tax policies aiming for the
stabilization of the economy produce allocation distortions that outweigh the stabilization
gains and therefore reduce welfare. Tax policies can be welfare-improving if the economy
is already subject to other distortions such as imperfect competition or externalities, e.g.
Easley et al. (1993) and Hairault et al. (2001).
4For example, Baxter (1997) and Kollmann (1998) examined the eﬀects of taxes as
well as government spending to explain the twin deﬁcits and the U.S. trade balance,
respectively.
5Papers with deterministic open-economy models include Frenkel and Razin (1992),
Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Razin and Sadka (1994), Bovenberg (1994), Karayalcin (1995),
and Mendoza and Tesar (1998, 2001).
3Optimality of procyclical tax policy is analogous to the procyclical nature
of optimal monetary policy when shocks are from the supply side, as shown
in Ireland (1996), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), and Kim and Henderson
(2002). We also compare optimal tax policy under the Nash equilibrium
and the cooperative equilibrium. Results show that the non-cooperative and
cooperative tax policies are similar in all three taxes and welfare gains from
t a xp o l i c yc o o r d i n a t i o ni sq u i t es m a l l .
The remaining of the paper are as follows. Section 2 describes a two-
country model of a production economy with capital and labor. We also
explain the second-order accurate solution method. Section 3 reports sim-
ulation results for welfare implications of optimal tax policy in both closed
and open economies. We analyze two versions of the open economy model:
small open economy and two-country models. In order to help interpret
the welfare results, we examine impulse responses of main macro variables
to a positive productivity shock with and without contingent tax policies.
Section 4 provides the results of tax policy transmission and coordination.
We compare non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and cooperative equilibrium
and calculate potential welfare gains from tax policy coordination. Finally,
section 5 oﬀers the conclusion of the paper.
2 The Model
The economy consists of two countries which have the identical preference
and production technology. There is a single nondurable tradable good
serving as the numeraire. Each country consists of a representative house-
hold, a representative ﬁrm, and a government. Households decide the level
of consumption, leisure, investment, and bond holdings subject to budget
constraints. Bond holdings and investment are subject to adjustment costs.
We assume that the international ﬁnancial market is incomplete in the sense
that agents can trade only state-non-contingent bonds.
The government is described as a sequence of government spending and
tax rates on consumption, capital income and labor income. The entire
amount of tax revenue, net of ﬁxed government spending, is distributed to
households as lump-sum transfers in each period. The transfers can be neg-
ative and in this case they operate as lump-sum taxes. The use of lump-sum
t r a n s f e r sa l l o w su st oa v o i dp o t e n t i a la dditional distortions from adjusting
other tax rates to balance the budget. The only source of disturbances in
the economy is productivity shocks which can be correlated across countries.
Foreign variables are denoted by asterisks and their behavior is symmetric
4to the home country when not speciﬁed.
2.1 Households and Firms
Households enter the market owning one unit of labor at time t with pre-
determined capital and bond holding. The household receives its wage and
rental income from ﬁrms, and its interest income out of risk-free bonds.
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where Ct is the level of consumption, and 1 − Lt the amount of leisure.
Households in both countries have the same discount factor β.
The budget constraint of household is given by:





=( 1 − τlt)wtLt +[ ( 1− τkt)rt + τktδ]Kt + Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt, (2)
where Bt denotes the quantity of international bonds purchased in period t
maturing in t+1,R t is the gross interest rate on bonds, rt is the rental rate,
wt is the wage rate, and τ represents tax rates (τc = consumption tax rate,
τk = capital income tax rate and τl = labor income tax rate). Note that




2 .6 Tt is the lump-sum transfer (tax) to the
household which amounts to the budget surplus (deﬁcit).










Az e r oφ implies no adjustment costs. A positive φ implies the presence of
adjustment costs and φ =1corresponds to a loglinear capital accumulation
equation.7
6Using the bond holding adjustment costs allows us to avoid the nonstationarity prob-
lem in the small open economy model with incomplete markets. See Kim and Kose (2003)
for a detailed discussion on this issue.
7See Kim (2003) for comparison of this with other speciﬁcations of investment adjust-
ment costs.





While labor cannot move across countries, investment in the domestic coun-
try can be ﬁnanced by foreign capital. A No-Ponzi-Game condition is im-
posed on the household’s borrowing.
Productivity variable At and A∗
t, representing stochastic components of




























ε∗,a n dρ(εt,ε ∗
t)=ψ for
all t. ρ is the persistence of productivity shocks and ν represents the spillover
eﬀects. A non-zero ψ means that the innovations are contemporaneously
correlated across countries.
2.2 Government
Government income includes tax revenues as well as bond holding adjust-
ment costs and government spending Gt is assumed to be ﬁxed and unpro-
ductive. The government does not issue any debt and balances its budget
in each period by rebating all the tax revenue to households. That is, the
level of the government transfer satisﬁes




2 = Gt + Tt (6)
Domestic equilibrium is restricted by the optimizing behavior of the
household and the ﬁrm, and the government policy regarding tax and trans-
fer. The country’s resource constraint is
Yt + Rt−1Bt−1 = Ct + It + Gt + Bt. (7)
For the world equilibrium, the model requires bond market-clearing condi-
tion that bonds should be in zero net supply:
Bt + B∗
t =0 . (8)
The equations describing the equilibrium are listed in the Appendix.
In the benchmark case of exogenous tax policy, the tax rates are ﬁxed at
the steady state level (denoted with ¯ τ). Active (contingent) tax policy means
6that governments change tax rates according to the observed current-period
productivity.8 That is, tax policies are represented by the parameter η in
τt =¯ τ + ηAt (9)
where the sign of η indicates whether the tax policies are countercyclical
(if positive) or procyclical (if negative).9 Absolute value of η represents the
sensitivity of tax policy (i.e. how much tax rate should be changed to a unit
change in productivity).
We measure welfare gains by calculating the change in welfare when the
government implements active tax policies to the benchmark economy where
both countries face stochastic productivity shocks but tax rates are ﬁxed at
the steady state level (η =0for all three taxes). Welfare is measured in
terms of consumption units, a common measure in business cycle literature
as in Lucas (1987). The certainty equivalent consumption is based on the
conditional expectation of expected lifetime utility.10
2.3 Calibration
As for calibration, we use the conventional parameter values for annual data.
We use the annual data because tax rates do not vary much on a quarterly
basis. Capital depreciation rate, δ, is 0.1 per year. Labor share, α, is 0.6 and
the consumption share parameter, θ, i ss e tt om a t c ht h es t e a d ys t a t es h a r eo f
time devoted to market activities, 0.4. The representative agent’s discount
factor, β,i s0.95 s ot h a tt h es t e a d ys t a t ea n n u a lr e a li n t e r e s tr a t ei se q u a l
to 5%. We set the utility curvature parameter, σ, which determines the
household’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at 2. The elasticity of bond
holding costs, ζ, is set at 10−3 to allow only minimal eﬀects from holding
costs.11 Government spending is ﬁxed at the level that allows balanced
budget under the steady state. Finally, we need to decide the parameter
8Another possible form of tax policy is to change tax rate in response to the changes
in directly observable data such as output. However, both types of policies give similar
results.
9This deﬁnition of procyclical and countercyclical policy is slightly diﬀerent from that
used in monetary policy literature where cyclicality of policy is determined by the reaction
to the output gap or output itself, not productivity as in this paper..
10It is important to use conditional mean, instead of unconditional mean, in order to
correctly capture the dynamic transitional eﬀects of policy changes. See Kim et al. (2003)
for more on this.
11This number is a little bit higher than the one normally used in the literature. This
is to improve the accuracy of approximation. As ζ decreases, the model becomes more
nonstationary and the accuracy of approximation decreases dramatically.
7value for φ in capital adjustment costs. We set it at 0.2 to match the
volatility of investment in the data. Most previous studies reported that
productivity measures are highly persistent. For volatility of productivity
shocks, we follow Backus et al. (1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1995) and
assume that σε =0 .852%. We experiment with diﬀerent values for other
productivity parameters (ρ, ν, Ψ) for simulations.
Measuring aggregate tax rates is a complex and diﬃcult task and there
is little consensus on eﬀective tax rate measures. In this paper, we use
the aggregate eﬀective tax rates calculated by Mendoza et al. (1994).12
They calculate eﬀective tax rates for G-7 countries by dividing actual tax
payments by corresponding national accounts. These eﬀective tax rates
reﬂect government policies on tax credits, deductions, and exemptions as
well as information on statutory tax rates. These tax rates also reﬂect the
private sector’s behavior on tax payment over time. Moreover, they are
consistent with the concept of aggregate tax rates at the national level and
with the assumption of representative agents. These estimates, however,
can be sensitive to cyclical factors and shocks to tax revenues and bases.
Table 1 reports the properties of tax rates of G-7 countries. Average
tax rates are 12%, 31% and 36% for consumption, labor income and capital
income tax, respectively. We use these values as steady state tax rates. We
also estimate persistence of tax rates assuming an AR(1) structure. Table
1 shows that all tax rates are highly persistent. The average persistence
for G-7 countries are 0.84, 0.91 and 0.81 for consumption, labor income
and capital incomes taxes, respectively. The standard deviation of the tax
rates are 1.4%, 4.4% and 5.7% for consumption, labor income and capital
incomes taxes, respectively. Capital income taxes are more volatile than the
other two taxes, especially in Japan and UK (9.9% and 9.5%, respectively).
Compared to the productivity shocks, tax shocks are as much as or more
volatile on average (estimated standard deviation of productivity shocks are
around 1% in general for OECD countries). Even though our focus is on the
normative side, these numbers indicate that the tax policies that are more
than unit elastic to the productivity shocks are within the range of empirical
observation.
12Their method is in the same line with Lucas (1990) and Razin and Sadka (1994). A
number of papers have used this method to construct data on tax rates. See, for example,
Mendoza and Tesar (1998). Another widely-used alternative for tax rate data is aggregate
marginal tax rates. See Mendoza et al. (1994) for a detailed explanation and comparison
of diﬀerent computation methods.
82.4 Solution Method
We adopt a second-order accurate solution method to correctly calculate the
level of welfare. The accuracy of the conventional linearization method, as
in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), is widely known to be satisfactory in
computing second moments such as variances and correlation coeﬃcients.
However, the linearization method can generate inaccurate results in terms
of welfare calculations, especially in open-economy models.13 We follow Kim
et al. (2004) and adopt the second-order perturbation method to compute
the level of welfare.
3 Welfare Implications of Tax Policy
This section analyzes welfare implications of active, contingent tax policy
under both closed and open economies. We derive optimal response of tax
rates against productivity shock and measure maximum welfare gains com-
pared to ﬁxed tax policy. We use two types of open economy models. First,
we analyze a small open economy model with incomplete markets where
the world interest rate is exogenously given and ﬁxed. Next, we analyze
the two country setup where the interest rate is endogenously determined
by bond market clearing condition. The small open economy model can be
considered as an extension of the two country model with inﬁnite number of
countries. We use the two country model to analyze the eﬀects of tax policy
transmission and coordination in the next section.
3.1 Closed Economy
In the closed economy, active tax policy can be welfare improving because
governments should ﬁnance ﬁscal spending (which is positive and exoge-
nously given) by collecting distortionary taxes. That is, the steady state tax
rates are positive, which introduce distortions in the static and intertemporal
optimal conditions. Therefore, contingent tax policies can improve welfare
by reducing distortions in optimal conditions. We ﬁrst calculate the level of
welfare when tax rates are ﬁxed at the steady state level and then measure
potential welfare gains when government adopt active tax policy from the
benchmark ﬁxed tax case.
13Kim and Kim (2003) showed that the conventional linearization can be inaccurate as
to generate a paradoxical result that the level of welfare under autarky is higher than that
of the complete markets economy using a two-country model.
9Table 2 reports optimal η0
s for each tax with diﬀerent values of ρ (persis-
tence of productivity shock).14 First, optimal tax policy is countercyclical
for consumption (5.5 ∼ 6.3) and capital income taxes (1.8 ∼ 3.9), while it is
slightly procyclical (almost acyclical) for labor income tax (−0.2 ∼− 0.4).
Countercyclical tax policy means that governments lower tax rates when
the economy is hit by a negative productivity shock. Fluctuations of tax
rates according to these optimal policies are within the range of empirical
observations in table 1.
Welfare gains from consumption tax policy is the largest of the three,
while labor income tax policy brings almost negligible gains. When pro-
ductivity shock is very persistent (ρ =0 .95), maximum welfare gains from
active tax policy are 0.14%, 0.03%, and 0.004% of permanent consumption
for consumption, capital income and labor income taxes, respectively. These
gains decrease as shocks become less persistent. As productivity shocks be-
come less persistent, all three tax policies become more countercyclical (η0
s
increase).
Countercyclical consumption tax policy directly reduces the volatility of
consumption (reduces the level of increase in consumption with positive pro-
ductivity shock) and therefore improves welfare (stabilization gains). Coun-
tercyclical capital income tax policy mitigates positive responses of invest-
ment, output and therefore consumption when facing positive productivity
shock, and eventually reduces volatility of consumption and improves wel-
fare. On the other hand, labor income tax works through substitution eﬀect
with consumption. Positive productivity shock increases consumption but
at the same time reduces labor input through a substitution eﬀect. Pro-
cyclical labor income tax policy (reducing tax rates with positive shock),
however, increases labor input and mitigates the substitution eﬀects of la-
bor. This brings stabilization gains to the economy. However, this eﬀect is
quite negligible as we can see in quite low level of welfare gains from labor
i n c o m et a xp o l i c yi nT a b l e2 .
3.2 Open Economy
In the open economy model with bond trading, there is another source of
distortions in the economy; incomplete asset markets. Incomplete markets
distort intertemporal prices compared to complete markets economy. There-
fore, active tax policy can increase welfare in both ways; correcting market
14Other parameter values also aﬀect optimal ηs but the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant in
most cases.
10incompleteness (eﬃciency gains) and reducing distortions from taxes (sta-
bilization gains). We ﬁrst analyze the case of a small open economy where
the world interest rate exogenously given and ﬁxed.
3.2.1 Small Open Economy Model
Table 2 compares optimal tax policies and welfare gains in closed and open
economies. First, optimal tax response η for capital and labor income taxes
become procyclical in the small open economy model. Optimal ηk decreases
to −0.4 ∼− 1.6. It becomes more procyclical when shocks become less per-
sistent and the diﬀerence of optimal ηks between open and closed economies
widens. Welfare gains from optimal capital income tax policy is signiﬁ-
cantly lower than those in the closed economy model (0.001 ∼ 0.004 vs.
0.007 ∼ 0.025 to ).O p t i m a l ηl, originally procyclical (negative η) in the
closed economy, further decreases and becomes more procyclical when shocks
are persistent (ηl = −7.4 when ρ =0 .95). When shocks are less persistent
(ρ =0 .85), optimal ηl becomes same in both closed and open economies at
−0.2.O p t i m a lη for consumption tax becomes less countercyclical, decreas-
ing to 2.1 ∼ 3.7 (it was 5.5 ∼ 6.3 in the closed economy).
In the open economy, the current account works as buﬀer stock against
productivity shocks and plays a role for consumption smoothing (other than
investment channel which exists in the closed economy as well). The level
of consumption smoothing achieved in the open economy is larger than that
in the closed economy and therefore the role of business cycle stabilizing
policies is reduced. In the case of consumption tax where the optimal tax
policy is countercyclical in the closed economy, governments–when facing
positive shocks–do not have to increase tax rates as much as in the closed
economy case to stabilize business cycles. With positive shocks, agents can
smooth consumption by accumulating international bonds (lending to for-
eign countries). Therefore, optimal consumption tax becomes less counter-
cyclical.
Another channel of welfare gains is through mitigating market incom-
pleteness. The results in Table 2 show that optimal tax policy for both factor
income taxes becomes procyclical in the small open economy model, imply-
ing that procyclical factor income taxes mitigate market incompleteness.
Lowering tax rates with positive productivity shocks generates eﬃciency
gains by stimulating agents to produce more in a more productive state
and these eﬃciency gains exceed potential allocation distortions.15 This
15It is interesting that, in a diﬀerent framework, Yakadina (2002) also ﬁnds similar
behavior of optimal capital income tax rates in response to technology shocks.
11channel is not available in closed economy where extra output should be
consumed domestically. To understand the mechanism through which pro-
cyclical tax policy improves welfare by correcting market incompleteness, we
draw impulse responses to a positive productivity shock of the economy with
and without contingent tax policy. We also add impulse responses of the
complete markets economy (with tax rates ﬁxed at the same steady state)
where shocks are completely shared across countries. If procyclical tax pol-
icy moves the impulse responses of the incomplete markets economy towards
those of the complete markets economy, we can argue that procyclical tax
policy improves welfare through correcting market incompleteness.
Figure 1 is the impulse responses in the case of capital income tax policy
(ρ =0 .9, and ηk is set at 0 and −0.9 for ﬁx e da n da c t i v et a xp o l i c yc a s e s ,
respectively). Procyclical capital income tax policy increases investment
and labor input, and therefore output and consumption compared to the case
of ﬁxed tax policy. These responses become close to those of the complete
markets model.16 The most signiﬁcant eﬀects are on investment. With
procyclical capital income tax policy, investment rises almost 50% more than
i nt h ec a s ew i t hﬁxed tax policy for the ﬁrst several years. In the economy
with incomplete asset markets (without active tax policy), agents facing a
high productivity shock do not invest as much as they should were they
in the world with complete asset markets. Therefore, the procyclical tax
policy shifts the behavior of the incomplete markets economy towards the
complete markets equilibrium, resulting in a higher level of welfare. The fact
that capital income tax becomes procyclical in open economy indicates that
the eﬃciency gains from improving on market incompleteness (by adopting
procyclical tax policy) exceeds stabilization gains from reducing volatility
(by adopting countercyclical tax policy).
In Figure 2, we show the case of labor income tax policy (ρ =0 .9, and
ηl is set at 0 and −0.7 for ﬁxed and active tax policy cases, respectively).
Similar to Figure 1, under procyclical labor income tax policy, domestic
residents increase their working hours more than in the ﬁxed tax policy case
in response to a positive productivity shock, resulting in higher output and
consumption. As is the case with capital income tax, the incomplete asset
markets imply that agents facing a high productivity shock do not work as
much as they should were they in the world with complete asset markets.
Therefore, the procyclical tax policy moves the outcome of the incomplete
16It is well known that output, investment and labor input respond more to productivity
shocks in the complete markets economy, compared to the incomplete markets economy.
See Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kim et al. (2003) for details.
12markets economy towards the complete markets equilibrium.
These results provide interesting implications for optimal monetary pol-
icy literature. A number of studies have shown that optimal monetary policy
is procyclical with supply shocks (productivity shocks), while the optimal
policy is countercyclical with demand shocks. Procyclical interest rate pol-
icy improves welfare by reducing distortions from rigidities in the economy,
when hit by supply shocks. In this paper, the sources of distortions are dif-
ferent as our model has no nominal or real rigidities and the only distortions
are from distortionary taxes and market incompleteness. Even with diﬀer-
ent sources of distortions, this model produces the same result that optimal
capital and labor income tax policy is procyclical with supply shocks.
3.2.2 Two-country model
In the two country world, interest rate is endogenously determined by bond
market clearing condition. It is well known that interest rate is a negative
function of current world output; when world output increases temporarily,
interest rate decreases (see Kim et al., 2003, for example). With positive
shocks, agents would accumulate bonds for consumption smoothing purpose.
However, increasing demand for bonds increases bond price (lowers interest
rate), which lowers the amount of bond trading. Under the benchmark pa-
rameter values, endogenous interest rate (in the two country model) reduces
the amount of bond trading to the one-third of the level achieved in the case
of ﬁxed interest rate (in the small open economy model).
Table 2 shows optimal tax policies derived in the two country model.
Since endogenous interest rate reduces the amount of consumption smooth-
ing, optimal tax policy becomes more countercyclical (or less procyclical)
than the small open economy. For all cases, optimal tax policy η of the two
country model increases from that in the small open economy model, but
it is still lower than the closed economy model. Since the behavior of the
two country model lies between those of the closed and small open economy
models, optimal tax policies should be between the two values. For exam-
ple, optimal η for consumption tax is 3.4 ∼ 3.9 which is more countercyclical
than the small open economy case (2.1 ∼ 3.7) but less countercyclical than
the closed economy case (5.5 ∼ 6.3). For consumption tax, lower level of
consumption smoothing means that government should apply more coun-
tercyclical policy to reduce volatility of consumption compared to the case
with ﬁxed interest rate. Optimal ηl is identical to the case of small open
economy except when shock is very persistent (ρ =0 .95) where optimal ηl
becomes less procyclical than in the case of a small open economy. Optimal
13ηk even becomes positive when shocks are persistent. Welfare gains from
stabilization (by imposing countercyclical tax policy) dominates eﬃciency
gains from mitigating market incompleteness (by imposing procyclical tax
policy).
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3 shows how optimal η0
s and maximum welfare gains change when
parameter values change. In this table, we use the two country model with
the following parameter values; ρ (shock persistence) =0 .9,ζ (bond holding
adjustment cost parameter) =0 .001,ν(shock spillovers) =0 , Ψ (contem-
poraneous cross-country correlation of shocks) =0 .
We ﬁrst examine the case when bond holding adjustment costs increase
(ζ =0 .1). With higher adjustment costs, agents do not trade bonds as
much as in the benchmark case and the behavior of the economy approaches
that of the closed economy. Therefore, optimal η increases (become more
countercyclical or less procyclical). Eventually as ζ increases, incomplete
markets model becomes close to the closed economy model and optimal η
would be same as those in the closed economy model.
Next, we experiment by increasing spillovers of productivity shocks across
countries (positive ν). An increase in ν has the same eﬀects as increasing
persistence of shocks (ρ).T h e r e f o r eo p t i m a lη0
s when ρ =0 .9 and ν =0 .08
become almost identical to the optimal η0
s with ρ =0 .95 and ν =0 .17 Fi-
nally, we experiment by increasing contemporaneous correlation of shocks
(Ψ =0 .5). An increase in Ψ has similar eﬀects as increasing shock per-
sistence. Therefore, optimal η0
s become similar to those with high shock
persistence and welfare gains of optimal tax policy also increase.
4 Non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium
In this section, we relax the assumption of ﬁxed tax rates in foreign country
and analyze optimal tax policy when foreign tax rates change. First, we
vary the reaction of the foreign country’s tax policy and draw the best
response curve of the domestic country and ﬁnd the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium. Next, we calculate the cooperative equilibrium and analyze
welfare gains from tax policy coordination. We set the shock persistence
parameter ρ at 0.85.
17See Kim et al. (2003) for detailed explanation of the relationship between shock
persistence and spillovers in incomplete market models.
14Figure 3 shows the welfare gains of active capital income tax policy
when foreign tax rate is ﬁxed (η∗
k =0 ). In this case, domestic welfare is
maximized when ηk = −0.9, a decrease in capital income tax rate by 0.9%
with a 1% increase in productivity. The maximum welfare gains are quite
small at 0.001% of permanent consumption, as shown in Table 4. We observe
slightly positive spillover eﬀects of procyclical capital income tax policy in
that foreign welfare gains are positive at 0.0006%. We can derive the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium by drawing best response curves of the two
countries. For capital income tax, the best response curves are vertical and
horizontal lines, meaning that optimal ηk does not depend on foreign tax
policy. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is achieved when ηk = η∗
k = −0.9
and the welfare gains are 0.00165% which is higher than the domestic welfare
gains when foreign country does not implement any tax policy. This is due
to positive spillover eﬀects.
This non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, however, does not maximize the
world welfare. We deﬁne the cooperative equilibrium as the outcome when
both countries use their tax policy to maximize the average of domestic
and foreign welfare.18 For capital income tax, the cooperative equilibrium
is achieved when ηk = η∗
k = −1.1, suggesting that the capital income tax
policy should be more procyclical (only slightly) than the Nash equilibrium
for the maximization of world welfare. The welfare gains at the cooperative
equilibrium are 0.0017%. We measure the welfare gains from cooperation
by taking the diﬀerence of welfare level between the Nash solution and the
cooperative solution. In the case of capital income tax, the gains from
cooperation is 0.00005% of permanent consumption.
Figure 4 plots the welfare gains of the two countries when the domestic
government changes ηl holding η∗
l constant at zero. The maximum wel-
fare gains are quite small at 0.0004% of permanent consumption, and it is
achieved when ηl = −0.2, interpreted as a decrease in labor income tax rate
by 0.2% with a 1% positive productivity shock. In this case, the procycli-
cal labor income tax policy (negative ηl) produces negative spillover eﬀects
and decreases the level of foreign welfare. We can derive the Nash equilib-
rium by using the best response functions. The optimal tax policy stays
unchanged when foreign tax policy moves from the ‘no response’ case, and
the two reaction functions meet at ηl = η∗
l = −0.2. Because of the negative
spillover, the welfare increases only by 0.00004% in the Nash equilibrium.
18In our cooperative solution, each country’s tax rates respond to its own productivity
shocks. It would of course create more welfare gains if tax rates respond to both countries’
productivity shocks.
15The cooperative equilibrium is achieved when the two countries implement
less procyclical policy at ηl = η∗
l = −0.1, and the size of welfare gain is
0.0002%. Welfare gains from cooperation is 0.00016%, which is larger than
the case of capital income tax but still small in the absolute term. Figure
5 shows the welfare gains of consumption tax policy. With no foreign tax
policy (η∗
c =0 ) ,o p t i m a lηc is at 3.4 with welfare gains of 0.015%. The Nash
equilibrium is at ηc = η∗
c =3 .7 with welfare gains of 0.0192%. Cooperative
equilibrium is at ηc = η∗
c =4 .0 and the welfare gains from cooperation is
0.0001%.
In sum, optimal tax policy under the Nash equilibrium and the coop-
erative equilibrium are quite similar in all three taxes. The cooperative
equilibrium brings positive welfare gains compared to the Nash equilibrium
but the absolute amount of welfare gains are quite small.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The conventional idea in the literature is that optimal tax policy is coun-
tercyclical rather than procyclical. We have shown that this proposition
is true only in the closed economy setup where countercyclical tax policy
brings stabilization gains. In the open economy model where agents can
trade international bonds for consumption smoothing purpose, optimal fac-
tor income tax policies become procyclical. Procyclical tax policy stimulates
agents to produce more in a more productive state and agents can take ad-
vantage of this extra output through international lending and borrowing. In
other words, procyclical tax policy moves responses of the incomplete mar-
kets economy (to productivity shock) close to those of the complete markets
economy, thereby improving welfare. For capital and labor income taxes,
these eﬃciency gains from procyclical tax policy exceed stabilization gains
from countercyclical tax policy, which makes optimal tax policy procyclical.
We also show that optimal tax policies under the Nash equilibrium and
the cooperative equilibrium are similar and welfare gains from tax policy
coordination are quite small.
In general, welfare gains from active tax policies are quite small com-
pared to welfare gains of tax policy reform that changes tax rates perma-
nently, as considered in Mendoza and Tesar (1998, 2001). This is because
the tax policies considered in this paper are ﬁne-tuning in that tax rates
can only respond to business cycles (changes in productivity) in the econ-
omy. However, it is less diﬃcult to implement such policies compared to the
permanent changes in tax rates. Moreover, active tax policies can play an
16important role in stabilizing an economy where monetary policy cannot be
used for the stabilization purpose, such as in the member countries of the
European Union.
17AA p p e n d i x
A.1 The ﬁrst-order conditions
The domestic economy is described by the following 12 equations together
with equations for productivity shocks and tax processes:
0=( 1 − σ)Ut −
h
Cθ







0=λtCt(1 + τct) − θ(1 − σ)Ut,









0=βRtEt (λt+1) − λt(1 + ζBt),





0=Yt + Rt−1Bt−1 − Ct − It − Gt − Bt,
0=wtLt − αYt,
















(1 − δ)λt+1 (It+1/δ)
φ (Kt+1)
−φ
+λt+1 (rt+1(1 − τk,t+1)+δτk,t+1)
¸
,
where λt and µt are Lagrangian multipliers for the budget constraint and
capital accumulation equation, respectively. There are foreign country ana-
logues to the above equations. The world equilibrium is achieved by impos-
ing the world resource constraint.
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21Table 1. Properties of estimated tax rates
<Average tax rates>



























































































average 0.014 0.044 0.057
Note: C-tax: consumption tax rate, L-tax: labor income tax rate, K-tax: cap-
ital income tax rate. Persistence is calculated from AR(1) coeﬃcient.
22Table 2. Optimal tax policies in closed and open economies
ρ =0 .85 ρ =0 .9 ρ =0 .95
K-tax(ηk) Closed 3.9 (0.007) 2.6 (0.012) 1.8 (0.025)
Two-country -0.9 (0.001) 0.1 (0.00003) 0.7 (0.004)
Small open -1.6 (0.005) -0.8 (0.002) -0.4 (0.001)
L-tax(ηl) Closed -0.2 (0.0005)- 0 . 3 ( 0.001)- 0 . 4 ( 0.004)
Two-country -0.2 (0.0004) -0.7 (0.005) -2.0 (0.05)
Small open -0.2 (0.0004) -0.7 (0.004) -7.4 (0.33)
C-tax(ηc) Closed 6.3 (0.05) 6.1 (0.08) 5.5 (0.14)
Two-country 3.4 (0.02) 3.6 (0.03) 3.9 (0.18)
Small open 2.1 (0.004) 3.0 (0.02) 3.7 (0.09)
Note: Small open: Small open economy with ﬁxed world interest rate.
Two-country: Two country model with endogenously determined world interest
rate.
Numbers in this table are optimal ηs. Numbers in the parentheses are per-
centage welfare gains of active tax policy, over the benchmark case with ﬁxed tax
policy. Welfare gains are estimated as percentage changes in certainty equivalent
consumption level, while the certainty equivalent consumption is calculated from
conditional welfare changes over the benchmark economy.
23Table 3. Sensitivity analysis
Parameters K-Tax(ηk) L-Tax(ηl) C-Tax(ηc)
Two-country
(benchmark)
0.1 (0.00003) -0.7 (0.005) 3.6 (0.03)
Low capital
mobility
ζ =0 .1 1.5 (0.005) -0.4 (0.002) 5.5 (0.07)
Positive
spillovers
ν =0 .08 0.6 (0.006) -2.0 (0.02) 4.1 (0.12)
Correlated
shocks
Ψ =0 .5 0.4 (0.0004) -0.9 (0.007) 3.9 (0.04)
Note: Numbers for the benchmark open economy are taken from table 2.
24Table 4. Welfare eﬀects of tax policy coordination






















1. Domestic tax policy only
2. Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
3. Cooperative equilibrium
For 2 and 3, home, foreign and world welfare gains are identical due to the
symmetry of countries.





















































































































































−3 Figure 3. Welfare effects of capital income tax policy at Home (η *=0)

























← Max(Home) at η =−0.9
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−4 Figure 4. Welfare effects of labor income tax policy at Home (η *=0)
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−3 Figure 5. Welfare effects of consumption tax policy at Home (η *=0)
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